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A note on Thomson's...

## A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule

Nir Dagan

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### Abstract

Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem
of fair division when
preferences are single-peaked, *J. Econ. Theory* 63 (1994), 219-245)
proved that the uniform rule of fair division problem,
where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is
bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a
setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the
uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity,
even in a setting of a finite number of potential agents. A similar
result is obtained by replacing envy-freeness with individual rationality
from equal division.

**JEL:** D63, C71.

*Journal of Economic Theory* 69:255-261 (1996)

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### Cited by

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