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Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij

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Abstract

We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)

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