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The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij

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Abstract

We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, bargaining, allocation.

Mathematical Social Sciences 26:287-297 (1993)

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Cited by

• Takehiro Inohara, Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making, European Journal of Operational Research 180:1260-1271 (2007)
• Juan D Moreno-Ternero, Proportionality and non-manipulability in bankruptcy problems, International Game Theory Review 8:127-139 (2006)
• Joe Malkevitch, Resolving bankruptcy claims, Feature Column, Monthly Essays on Mathematical Topics, AMS website (March 2005)
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• Luis C. Corchón and Carmen Herrero, A decent proposal, Spanish Economic Review 6:107-125 (2004)
• Guni Orshan, Federico Valenciano, and José M. Zarzuelo, The bilateral consistent prekernel, the core, and NTU bankruptcy problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 28:268–282 (2003)
• William Thomson, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey, Mathematical Social Sciences 45:249–297 (2003)
• Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar, The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems, Mathematical Social Sciences 42:307-328 (2001)
• Somdeb Lahiri, Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems, European Journal of Operations Research 131:162-170 (2001)
• Carmen Herrero, Michael Maschler, and Antonio Villar, Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights–egalitarian solution, Mathematical Social Sciences 37:59–77 (1999)
• Stef Tijs and Maurice Koster, General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods, Annals of Operations Research 84:137-164 (1998)
• Carmen Herrero, Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims, Social Choice and Welfare 15:113-119 (1998)
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• Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij, Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems, International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)
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