The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach

Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij

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We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, bargaining, allocation.

Mathematical Social Sciences 26:287-297 (1993)

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Cited by

  1. Stef Tijs and Gert-Jan Otten, Compromise values in cooperative game theory, Sociedad de Estadística e Investigacíon Operativa (TOP) 1:1-36 (1993)
  2. Roberto Serrano, Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus, Journal of Mathematical Economics 24:319-329 (1995)
  3. Gert-Jan Otten, Hans Peters, Oscar Volij, Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences, Economic Theory 7:291-306 (1996)
  4. Nir Dagan, New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules, Social Choice and Welfare 13:51-59 (1996)
  5. Theo S. H. Driessen, Tree enterprises and bankruptcy ventures - A game theoretic similarity due to a graph theoretic proof, Discrete Applied Mathematics 79:105-117 (1997)
  6. Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij, Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems, International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)
  7. Stef Tijs and Maurice Koster, General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods, Annals of Operations Research 84:137-164 (1998)
  8. Carmen Herrero, Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims, Social Choice and Welfare 15:113-119 (1998)
  9. Carmen Herrero, Michael Maschler, and Antonio Villar, Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights–egalitarian solution, Mathematical Social Sciences 37:59–77 (1999)
  10. Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar, The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems, Mathematical Social Sciences 42:307-328 (2001)
  11. Somdeb Lahiri, Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems, European Journal of Operational Research 131:162-170 (2001)
  12. Youngsub Chun, James Schummer, and William Thomson, Constrained egalitarianism: a new solution for claims problems, Seoul Jurnal of Economics 14:269-297 (2001)
  13. Guni Orshan, Federico Valenciano, and José M. Zarzuelo, The bilateral consistent prekernel, the core, and NTU bankruptcy problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 28:268–282 (2003)
  14. William Thomson, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey, Mathematical Social Sciences 45:249–297 (2003)
  15. Luis C. Corchón and Carmen Herrero, A decent proposal, Spanish Economic Review 6:107-125 (2004)
  16. Joe Malkevitch, Resolving bankruptcy claims, Feature Column, Monthly Essays on Mathematical Topics, AMS website (March 2005)
  17. Marco Mariotti and Antonio Villar, The Nash rationing problem, International Journal of Game Theory 33:367-377 (2005)
  18. Antonio Villar, Cómo repartir cuando no hay bastante, Lecturas de Economía 62:9-34 (2005)
  19. Juan D Moreno-Ternero, Proportionality and non-manipulability in bankruptcy problems, International Game Theory Review 8:127-139 (2006)
  20. Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl, Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims: normative judgments and actual negotiations, Social Choice and Welfare 27:571-594 (2006)
  21. Takehiro Inohara, Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making, European Journal of Operational Research 180:1260-1271 (2007)
  22. Gustavo Bergantiños and Leticia Lorenzo, The equal award principle in problems with constraints and claims, European Journal of Operational Research 188:224–239 (2008)
  23. Toru Hokari and William Thomson, On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency, Journal of Mathematical Economics 44:1057-1071 (2008)
  24. Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels, A cooperative bargaining approach to the assignment market, Group Decision and Negotiation 17:553–563 (2008)